Pre-War Naval ROTC Program

The National Defense Act of 4 March 1925 empowered the President to establish and maintain, in civilian educational institutions granting degrees, NROTC units to train a maximum of 1,200 officer candidates. Administration of the program was the responsibility of the Bureau of Navigation (later Bureau of Naval Personnel). The Navy initially selected six institutions and established units in time for the commencement of the 1926 fall academic term.

These schools, chosen with respect to academic standing, facilities, and male student enrollment, were Yale, Harvard, Northwestern, Georgia Institute of Technology, California, and Washington.  The assigned mission of the NROTC was providing systematic training and instruction in naval subjects to further the plan for national defense (i.e., to educate and train officers for the Naval Reserve). The staff of each unit, commanded by a Navy captain (designated the Professor of Naval Science and Tactics), included six regular Navy line officers and four retired chief petty officers. Interestingly, the first NROTC unit commanding officer at the University of California was Commander Chester A. Nimitz. He later achieved fame, and the rank of Fleet Admiral, as one of the principal architects of victory in the Pacific theater during WWII.

Mid 1930’s Naval ROTC Expansion

With the exception of the addition of new units, the structure of the NROTC remained essentially unchanged until 1943. Through 1938, NROTC program output totaled only 1,520. During this leisurely period, few of those commissioned into the Volunteer Reserve received any practical training beyond NROTC. Thus, their value as Reserve officers would generally dissipate within six years, and the majority would “wash out” for failure to qualify for promotion. 

There were not even sufficient NROTC graduates to compensate for annual Fleet Reserve attrition. In the mid-30s, the Navy considered varying the course, to make NROTC graduates eligible for classifications other than deck and increasing output by filling quotas and adding units.

The Navy sponsored legislation for doubling the quota from 1,200 to 2,400 in both 1935 and 1936, gaining congressional approval in 1937. While the new bill doubled the quota, it provided no funds for expansion. The Navy finally acquired sufficient money to set up two units in 1938 (UCLA and Tulane), one in 1939 (Minnesota), and two in 1940 (Michigan and Oklahoma).

Throughout the period from 1935 to 1940, the Navy had surveyed a number of schools to evaluate interest in the NROTC program, and it initiated inspections of a number of these schools. In addition, it developed more specific standards for the selection of unit sites. The new standards included scholarship and reputation, size, plant and facilities, probable support, and general surroundings. Additionally, the Navy now desired to place units at schools with strong technical and engineering departments. The Navy also began to appreciate the public relations impact of NROTC—the selection of Minnesota in the traditionally isolationist Midwest reflected this awareness. University interest in obtaining NROTC units increased substantially during the second half of the decade of the ’30s, reflecting the growth of war possibilities.

June 1940 V-7 Program Announced

In June 1940, three days after the Franco-German armistice, the Navy announced the V-7 Program. It was to further the flow of college men into the Reserve Midshipman schools. As originally devised, V-7 called for the enlistment of 5,000 men as apprentice seamen who would receive one month's training afloat. Upon successful completion of the cruise, candidates would become Reserve Midshipman and commence a ninety-day course of instruction leading to a commission as ensign in the naval reserve. Candidacy required completion of at least two years of college. During the year following the announcement of the program, 7,200 enlisted but only 4,600 successfully earned commissions. This large attrition of candidates led the Navy to raise the educational requirements to four years of college, including two semesters of mathematics. 

After our entry into the war, the availability of manpower to meet all needs of the country could no longer be assumed. Selective Service hung-over college juniors and seniors. Hence, a week after U.S. entrance into the war, the Navy revised V-7 to permit the enlistment of college juniors and seniors. 

The University of Wisconsin Interest in the Naval ROTC Program

The late 30's expansion of NROTC and the general drift toward war attracted the attention of the University of Wisconsin. With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, the university cautiously began to explore the possibility of seeking appointment as an NROTC site. The first and most vigorous spokesman for the university was the colorful and energetic Joseph W. Jackson, executive director of the Madison and Wisconsin Foundation (later the Madison Chamber of Commerce). Colonel Jackson had served with distinction in World War I and, an ardent patriot, became one of the principal boosters of the university's role in the national defense effort of World War II. He served as both a proponent of and lobbyist for virtually all Navy and university interactions including the Radio School, V-12 program, the honorary degree for White House Chief of Staff Admiral Leahy, and especially the NROTC Program.

Not able, in late 1939, to convince President Dykstra that the university should apply for one of the two new NROTC units scheduled for June of 1940, Jackson, working closely with Wisconsin Congressman Charles Hawks, Jr., carefully followed the process by which Michigan and Oklahoma won appointment. By August Jackson was again lobbying Dykstra, this time armed with information that the Navy would expand NROTC by 16 units. In September, Congress passed the necessary expansion legislation, and immediately the pace of activity directed toward a Wisconsin NROTC unit went to "flank speed.” On 3 September, when Dykstra was away from Madison, Jackson boldly asked Congressman Hawks to file a tentative application for one of the sixteen new NROTC units, citing the concurring support of John Callahan, chairman of the University Regents' Executive Committee. Jackson immediately wrote to Dykstra, advising him of his communication to Hawks, expressing urgency because of the number of applications on file (including in-state rival Marquette), and advising of the necessity that "someone directly representing the university wire the application to the Secretary of the Navy.” Jackson, trying to leave no stone unturned and allay Dykstra's concern for possible Army opposition, even queried UW ROTC commandant Colonel Weaver and verified his support. Dykstra, by that time a convert, obediently wired the Secretary of the Navy, "University of Wisconsin situated in midst of four large magnificent lakes requests consideration in connection with allocation of Naval ROTC units recently provided for by Congress. No better location or facilities can be found anywhere." On 11 September Dykstra forwarded the formal application form provided by the Navy. However, on that same day, bad news arrived.

The university's crash effort was not taken sufficiently early.  Congressman Hawks advised Dykstra that the telegraphed application “was received too late for consideration in connection with the eight (8) new units already decided upon.... However, it was stated that eight...additional units are to be established about this time next year, and that every possible consideration well be given to your application....” Acting Navy Secretary Forrestal and Navigation Bureau Chief Jacobs separately confirmed receipt of the application and promised consideration in 1941. Hoping to increase the political pressure on the Navy for success in the next increment, the indefatigable Jackson turned again to the Wisconsin Congressional delegation, and especially to Wisconsin Senators LaFollette and Wiley for support, even suggesting that “in as much as the University is already fairly well crowded, I am wondering if it might not be altogether possible to set up a special building which could be erected under the present national defense program.”